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Under what conditions, if any, do medical professionals 
enjoy a right of conscience? That is, when must a just state 
accommodate a physician’s, pharmacist’s, or other medical 
professional’s refusal to provide legally and professionally 
sanctioned services to which she morally objects; for example, 
by enacting laws that enable her to do so without fear of losing 
her job or her professional privileges?1 Recent assertions by 
several pharmacists of a right to conscientiously refuse to 
fill prescriptions for the so-called morning-after pill, and by a 
California fertility doctor of a right to conscientiously refuse to 
provide fertility treatment to a lesbian, have once again made this 
question a prominent topic of discussion amongst philosophers 
and professional ethicists. Nearly all argue (correctly, in my 
view) that if it entails the imposition of excessive burdens 
on others, then the state may justifiably refuse to recognize 
a professional’s right of conscience. However, a number of 
prominent applied ethicists also endorse a second constraint 
on the professional’s right of conscience, arguing that it extends 
only to certain kinds of beliefs; specifically, only those that are 
reasonable, or integral to the ethical practice of medicine, 
or not at odds with a principle of non-discrimination. This I 
think mistaken. As I will now demonstrate, if the fundamental 
moral importance of preserving an agent’s integrity provides 
the justificatory basis for a professional’s right of conscience, 
a position most of the authors I consider here explicitly adopt, 
then medical professionals enjoy a pro tanto or defeasible claim 
to accommodation by the state regardless of the content of the 
belief to which they wish to remain true.
One of the most common arguments offered by 
contemporary writers in defense of a medical professional’s 
right of conscience appeals to the fundamental moral 
importance of preserving an agent’s integrity.2 A person acts 
with integrity in a particular case if and only if she conforms 
to certain standards that she believes apply to her in that case. 
To compromise one’s integrity, then, is to fail to conform to a 
certain standard in circumstances where one believes that one 
could, and should, do so. Though these standards need not be 
moral ones—for example, a musician might compromise her 
integrity as an artist by “selling out” to a large corporation—I will 
focus here solely on moral standards, and so moral integrity. 
The preservation of a person’s moral integrity is of greater 
prudential and moral concern the more central conformity to a 
particular moral standard is to that person’s identity or sense of 
self, and her conception of what makes her life meaningful or 
worthwhile. If an agent betrays one or more of her core moral 
commitments, then her ability to lead what she believes to be 
a good life will be grievously harmed. Typically, when a person 
asserts that she cannot in good conscience perform a certain 
action, what she means is that were she to do so she would 
compromise her moral integrity.
Most people will readily agree that states have a duty 
to ensure that their subjects enjoy their basic moral rights. 
Suppose, somewhat more controversially, that people have 
basic moral rights to those goods in the absence of which it is 
extremely unlikely that they will live a good life, whatever its 
specifics. I suggest that the preservation of an agent’s integrity 
constitutes a necessary condition for living a good life, and 
therefore it is something to which all people have a basic moral 
right. It follows that if it is to be legitimate (and perhaps if it is to 
be just), the state must at least make a good faith effort to protect 
its subjects’ attempts to act with integrity. That is, it must grant 
them a right of conscience. This right is not absolute; rather, in 
some cases the moral demands it generates will be outweighed 
or defeated by duties that correlate to other basic moral rights, or 
perhaps other types of moral considerations. That is why nearly 
all theorists (though, alas, not all laws) characterize the right 
of conscience as a conditional, qualified, or prima facie one. 
Nevertheless, the critical importance of acting with integrity for 
a person’s ability to lead a good life grounds a weighty moral 
claim against the state that it refrain from compelling people 
to betray their deepest commitments.3
The foregoing account of the right of conscience clearly 
justifies the state in investigating the sincerity of a conscientious 
objector’s belief. After all, if that person does not truly believe 
that his legal and professional obligations are at odds with his 
moral ones, then acting as the law requires will not actually 
cause him to compromise his integrity. Grounding a right of 
conscience in the fundamental importance of preserving 
an agent’s integrity also justifies the state in exploring the 
centrality of the commitment threatened by compliance with 
the law to the agent’s sense of self and her understanding of 
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life’s meaning and worth. The more peripheral compliance 
with the standard in question is to a person’s self-worth, self-
respect, and ability to lead a good life, the less weight her 
right of conscience will carry in cases where it conflicts with 
other moral considerations, and vice versa. However, nothing 
in the argument from integrity warrants the state making its 
accommodation of a conscientious objector conditional on the 
justifiability or reasonableness of the commitment she believes 
she will betray if she obeys the law. The point of a right of 
conscience is to protect a person’s ability to conform to those 
standards she believes are binding on her, regardless of whether 
they actually are. All the state need ascertain, therefore, is that 
the agent sincerely believes that complying with the law will 
require her to violate certain moral commitments, in which 
case the law threatens her integrity. This does not mean that 
the state should rescind from making any judgments of moral 
truth or rational justifiability; it will (or at least should) do so 
when it legislates, and it will (or should) do so when, in cases 
of conflict, it balances the professional’s right of conscience 
against competing moral considerations. Nevertheless, if the 
fundamental moral importance of preserving an agent’s integrity 
does provide a sufficient justification for a conditional right of 
conscience, then it does so for any belief an agent might have, 
no matter how unreasonable or reprehensible it may be.4
Dan Brock explicitly endorses the argument from integrity 
for a conditional right of conscience. Preserving an agent’s 
integrity, he writes, “gives others reason to respect her doing 
so [i.e., not violating her moral commitments], not because 
those commitments must be true or justified, but because the 
maintenance of moral integrity is an important value, central 
to one’s status as a moral person.”5 Yet immediately after 
presenting this rationale for a right of conscience, he maintains 
that a white physician who sincerely believes in the immorality 
of the mixing of the races lacks even a conditional claim to 
accommodation by his employer, the professional organizations 
to which he belongs, or the state that (indirectly) licenses him 
to practice medicine. Why? Brock answers as follows: 
a social consensus (not to say unanimity) exists 
in the United States that racial discrimination in 
access to services like health care is unethical, and 
this is reflected in the law as well. Most people 
would consider Dr. A. [the racist physician] unjustly 
prejudiced, despite his offering a moral or religious 
defense of his position. Dr. A’s belief does not deserve 
respect, even if his moral integrity does. Public policy 
holds that social justice requires prohibiting this form 
of discrimination and that if Dr. A’s moral beliefs and 
integrity are in conflict with this policy, they and not 
the policy must give way.6
By itself, the fact that most people think Dr. A’s moral belief 
mistaken does not justify denying him even a conditional right 
of conscience. After all, a liberal state guarantees its citizens 
a great deal of freedom to act in ways the majority believes to 
be immoral. More importantly, given that Brock thinks the right 
of conscience has its justificatory basis in the importance of 
acting with integrity, and that the value of acting with integrity 
does not depend on the truth or justifiability of a person’s 
commitments, the unjustly prejudicial nature of Dr. A’s beliefs 
makes no difference to his claim to accommodation. While 
Brock rightly claims that “Dr. A’s belief does not deserve respect, 
even if his moral integrity does,” he fails to draw the proper 
conclusion from this observation, which is that respect for Dr. 
A’s moral integrity requires that the state acknowledge Dr. A’s 
conditional right to act as his conscience dictates.
In many circumstances, the cost to patients in need of the 
services that Dr. A can provide, and/or the cost to the state (and 
so its citizens) of accommodating Dr. A’s conscientious refusal to 
treat black patients may be excessive. That is, accommodating 
Dr. A’s conscience may make it unreasonably burdensome 
for black patients to get the medical treatment to which they 
are morally and legally entitled, or for the state to ensure they 
have access to such treatment. When this is so, the state will 
not wrong Dr. A if it forces him to choose between providing 
legal services he believes to be immoral or exiting the medical 
profession (or at least the particular professional role he 
currently occupies).7 Yet there is no reason to assume that the 
cost of accommodating a professional’s desire to conform to a 
principle that conflicts with legal and professional prohibitions 
on discrimination will always be excessive. Consider, for 
example, Benitez v. NCWC, a recent case in California in 
which two physicians at a fertility clinic conscientiously refused 
to provide treatment for an unmarried lesbian woman. The 
actual grounds for the physicians’ refusal to treat Benitez 
are a matter of dispute; they claimed to object to providing 
services to unmarried women, while Benitez claimed they 
discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation. 
For the purposes of this paper, we can simply stipulate that the 
physicians conscientiously objected to using their services to 
help homosexuals have children, say because they thought 
doing so would make them complicit in a sinful activity. As 
Jacob M. Appel points out, neither a commitment to ensuring 
the availability of fertility treatment for lesbians, nor the harm 
caused by the social stigma and discomfort associated with 
being refused care, warrant the state’s failure to accommodate 
the physicians’ desire to remain true to their beliefs.8 Benitez 
had no difficulty finding another physician willing to provide 
the services she sought. Nor is there any evidence that the 
number of fertility doctors conscientiously opposed to treating 
lesbians is large enough that some prospective homosexual 
patients are likely to have a significant burden imposed upon 
them if the state acknowledges a right of conscience in such 
cases, even if Benitez did not. As for the discomfort of being 
refused care, Appel suggests that it is (or could be made to be) 
relatively easy for lesbians seeking fertility treatment to identify 
and avoid those physicians that refuse to serve them. It might 
be said in response that merely knowing that you cannot obtain 
services from certain medical professionals because they think 
a central feature of your way of life immoral harms a person. But 
even if it does, it is not obvious that this setback to a lesbian’s 
ability to lead a life she finds meaningful or worthwhile is 
weighty enough to justify the state’s refusal to accommodate 
a physician’s conscience.
Mark Wicclair also maintains that the importance of 
protecting an agent’s integrity provides the justificatory basis for 
a physician’s conditional right of conscience. The moral weight 
of a conscience-based objection to performing a legal service, 
Wicclair writes, “can be grounded in the value of moral integrity 
and self-respect as well as the significant harm associated with 
self-betrayal and loss of self-respect.”9 Like Brock, however, 
Wicclair also attempts to limit the kind of commitments for 
which a medical professional may seek accommodation. 
Specifically, he contends that a physician’s assertion of a right 
not to provide a particular treatment to which he conscientiously 
objects carries moral weight only if the standard he seeks 
to uphold references the goals and values of medicine. To 
illustrate, on Wicclair’s account a physician enjoys a conditional 
moral claim to exemption from a legal requirement to provide 
a given medical service if his reason for doing so appeals to 
an understanding of the duties to advance patients’ interests 
in life and health that is at odds with the one the law reflects. 
Brock’s racist doctor, however, lacks even a conditional claim 
to the state’s accommodation of his conscience, since the 
standard to which he wishes to conform is foreign to the goals 
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and values of medicine.
Why should our concern with preserving physicians’ 
moral integrity and self-respect, and with protecting them from 
the significant harm associated with self-betrayal and loss of 
self-respect, be limited to cases where the objector aims to 
uphold a commitments that “correspond[s] to one or more 
core values in medicine?” Surely there is nothing inherently 
different between the betrayal of principles integral to the ethical 
practice of medicine and those that are not, such that the former 
necessarily impose a far greater cost on people than does the 
latter. Why, then, does Wicclair shift from a concern to protect 
moral integrity per se to a concern to protect moral integrity only 
insofar as the principles to which a physician wishes to conform 
correspond to a core value in medicine? The answer is that he 
thinks it necessary to explain why medical professionals ought 
to enjoy a conditional claim to accommodation when most 
other professionals (and non-professionals) do not.
Suppose, as is almost always the case, that when an agent’s 
legal and professional obligations conflict with her moral 
beliefs, she can resolve the conflict and avoid self-betrayal by 
exiting the profession (or at least that particular role within the 
profession). In many cases, that is what a person must do if 
she wishes to preserve her moral integrity. Why is the same 
not true for medical professionals? Some justification must 
be given for why the state should acknowledge a conditional 
right to accommodation for a physician that conscientiously 
objects to providing certain legal services to her patients, as 
in the case of a Catholic doctor who thinks abortion is never 
morally permissible, but not for an advertising executive who 
conscientiously objects to working on an advertising campaign 
that promotes smoking because she thinks it would make 
her complicit in causing tobacco-related harms to people 
that have not freely and knowingly exposed themselves to 
the risk of those harms. Wicclair argues, correctly in my 
view, that this differential treatment cannot be grounded in a 
necessary inequality in the impact that physicians and other 
professionals can have on others’ well-being, autonomy, or life 
prospects. Whatever wrong or harm is involved in a physician’s 
conscientious refusal to heed a terminally ill patient’s request 
to have his feeding-tube removed may pale in comparison to 
the harm caused by an advertising campaign encouraging the 
use of tobacco. Instead, Wicclair suggests that a justification for 
according medical professionals, but not others, a conditional 
right of conscience can be found in the fact that medicine is a 
moral enterprise. This means that physicians should act on the 
basis of their obligations to patients, not self-interest, and that 
they should conduct themselves according to ethical values 
and professional standards, rather than as mere technicians 
providing whatever services their patients demand. What 
follows from this conception of medicine, Wicclair maintains, 
“is not that physicians should be guided by their personal 
values, irrespective of their content. Rather, the implication 
is that physicians should be guided by the goals and values 
of medicine.”10 Medicine’s special moral character, he seems 
to suggest, explains both why medical professionals, but not 
others, ought to enjoy a conditional right to accommodation 
by the state, and why that right encompasses only fidelity to 
principles that are integral to the practice of medicine.
This argument suffers from two defects. First, Wicclair 
needs to show that in their professional lives physicians should 
be guided only by the goals and values of medicine, so that 
he can then argue that only appeal to these ends can ground 
a physician’s right of conscience. No such inference follows 
from his characterization of medicine as a moral enterprise, 
however. A female doctor who sincerely believes that morality 
forbids her from treating men, and who asserts a conditional 
right to practice in accordance with this belief, acts neither 
from self-interest nor as a mere technician. Rather, she seeks 
to uphold the practice of medicine as a moral enterprise and 
conform to a further moral principle that does not correspond 
to any value in medicine. Wicclair might respond that non-
discrimination in the provision of treatment is a value integral 
to the practice of medicine, and cite in support of such a claim 
the World Medical Association’s 1948 Declaration of Geneva, as 
amended in 1994 and 2005, which states that a physician will 
not (or, more accurately, should not) permit “‘considerations 
of age, disease, or disability, creed, ethnic origin, gender, 
nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orientation, social 
standing or any other factor to intervene between [her] duty 
and [her] patient.” Despite the World Medical Association’s 
assertion, one might contest the claim that non-discrimination 
is a value integral to the practice of medicine, even if it is a true 
moral principle. More importantly, by hypothesis our physician 
is not denying that she has some duty to male patients—after 
all, the right she asserts is a conditional one. What is at issue 
is the specific content of the physician’s duty to male patients. 
Suppose that the objecting physician acknowledges a duty to 
ensure that male patients receive the types of treatment she is 
licensed to provide, but objects only to providing those services 
herself (as might be the case if her reason for refusing to treat 
male patients rests on her belief in a duty of sexual modesty). 
If this is all our physician asserts, then I maintain that either the 
actions the physician seeks to carry out without penalty do not 
violate her duty as described in the Declaration of Geneva, or 
that declaration’s characterization of the physician’s duty is 
morally unsound.
Note that I am not claiming that professional medical 
associations err when they assert that their members act 
unethically if they discriminate in the provision of their 
professional services on the basis of race, sex or gender, ethnicity, 
creed, nationality, political affiliation, or sexual orientation. 
Rather, I maintain only that even if this assertion is true (as I 
believe it is), it does not necessarily follow that those physicians 
who disagree with it have no claim to accommodation by the 
state or the professional bodies to whom it delegates some of 
its authority to regulate the practice of medicine.
Recall that Wicclair limits a physician’s right of conscience 
to cases of fidelity to a principle consonant with the goals and 
values of medicine because he thinks it necessary to explain 
why physicians have a defeasible claim to accommodation by 
their employer and the state, while advertising executives, and 
many other professionals and non-professionals, have no such 
claim. But simply limiting the scope of a right of conscience to 
certain features that are allegedly unique (or nearly unique) 
to the medical profession does not suffice to justify such a 
restriction. Rather, Wicclair must explain what is special about 
these values, such that fidelity to them but not to other values 
warrants accommodation. His failure to do so constitutes a 
second shortcoming with his argument. I conclude, therefore, 
that Wicclair fails to establish that when the principle or 
commitment a physician seeks to uphold does not correspond 
to a core value in medicine, he or she lacks even a conditional 
moral claim to accommodation.
Were Wicclair to abandon any attempt to defend the 
current asymmetry in the respective legal accommodations 
extended to physicians and advertising executives, then it seems 
he would have no reason to place any constraints on the kind 
of moral beliefs the desire to remain true to which justifies a 
moral claim to accommodation. Alternatively, it may be possible 
to offer a justification for the differential treatment afforded 
to medical professionals that does not place any restrictions 
on the sort of commitment for which a physician might seek 
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accommodation. For instance, differences in the institutional 
context in which professionals (and non-professionals) practice 
may justify legal accommodation for some, e.g., physicians 
that conscientiously object to providing certain treatments, 
but not others, e.g., advertising executives that conscientiously 
object to working on tobacco promotion campaigns. Given the 
highly regulated environment in which medical professionals 
already practice, it may be possible to implement a scheme 
for accommodating conscientiously objecting physicians 
without imposing much cost on potential patients, professional 
colleagues, employers, taxpayers, or the state. The same may 
not be true for advertising executives. If so, then the advertising 
executive’s claim to accommodation may be defeated by other 
moral considerations, such as the cost to employers and to 
the taxpayer of institutionalizing such a scheme. The key point 
here is not the truth of these claims regarding the relative costs 
of accommodating conscientiously objecting physicians and 
advertising executives. Rather, it is that if these claims are true, 
then the current practice of treating physicians and advertising 
executives differently may be consistent with according all 
persons a conditional right of conscience, regardless of the 
kind of belief they seek to uphold.
Though they are not as clear as Brock and Wicclair, Eva 
and Hugh LaFollete also appear to endorse the preservation of a 
person’s moral integrity as a sufficient justification for according 
her a defeasible right of conscience. They write that “individuals 
want to live their lives as they think best, and for many of us our 
moral beliefs are especially important,” and that we empathize 
with those who are forced to do what they think immoral.11 
Nevertheless, they too argue that the right of conscience does 
not extend to any and all beliefs to which a person might seek 
to remain true, even at the expense of violating the law and/or 
certain professional standards. Instead, they contend that a 
person enjoys a conditional claim to accommodation only if 
her beliefs are broadly similar to recognizable moral views, 
they are ones for which the conscientious objector can offer 
a defense, and they do not depend on implausible empirical 
claims or clearly mistaken inferences. As I will explain, however, 
they are wrong to do so.
Consider, first, LaFollete and LaFollete’s claim that “we 
demand that someone who claims to be taking a stand on 
conscience has views and employs reasoning reflecting values 
and empirical beliefs broadly similar to recognizable moral 
views.”12 They think such a demand justified because 
otherwise it makes the notion of a “moral belief ” 
meaningless. If  someone said that she was 
conscientiously opposed to feeding [her] children 
or stopping at traffic lights, then, barring some 
powerful explanation, we would not think that they 
are forwarding moral beliefs, no matter how sincerely 
uttered. If someone said that she was conscientiously 
opposed to paying parking fines because it killed 
humans, then, barring some powerful explanation, 
we would likewise deny that she is forwarding a 
moral claim.13
No doubt if someone advanced such a claim we would judge 
it to be seriously mistaken, an obviously false belief. But I 
see no reason to deny that these are moral beliefs (or, given 
that the examples are under-described, that they could be). 
After all, a person may conscientiously object to feeding her 
children because she believes she has a duty not to do so 
(just as Abraham believed he had a duty to sacrifice Isaac), or 
because she thinks parental autonomy encompasses a right to 
use starvation as a means for disciplining her children. Similarly, 
she may believe that stopping at traffic lights constitutes the 
acknowledgment of the state’s authority over her, and believe 
that she is under a duty to acknowledge no earthly authority. 
In each case, we can contrast the agent’s reason for behaving 
as she does with prudential reasons a person might have for 
doing so; for instance, the financial benefits of not having to 
spend money on her children, or the thrill of running a red 
light. As long as the contrast with self-interested reasons for 
action remains, characterizing the objector’s beliefs as moral, 
no matter how strange we may think it, does not render the 
notion of a moral belief meaningless. As for the third example 
LaFollete and LaFollete give to support their claim, involving 
conscientious objection to paying parking fines, it does not 
even involve a mistaken moral belief (at least if we assume 
the humans referred to are innocent), but only an erroneous 
belief regarding the causal connection between the payment 
of parking fines and the killing of human beings.
Of course, to acknowledge that the examples LaFollete and 
LaFollete give do constitute moral claims does not commit us to 
accommodating those who wish to act on them (in violation of 
the law). Rather, and as should be clear by now, the objector’s 
claim to accommodation must be balanced against competing 
moral interests, and in each of the examples LaFollete and 
LaFollete give it seems quite clear that the objector’s right of 
conscience will be defeated or outweighed by some other moral 
consideration. For example, the state’s duty to ensure that the 
objector’s children receive adequate nutrition defeats its duty to 
accommodate her conscientious objection to her children being 
fed. Thus LaFollete and LaFollete neither demonstrate that, on 
pain of rendering the idea of a moral belief meaningless, we 
must reject as moral those beliefs that are deeply at odds with 
prevailing views, nor that doing so is necessary to justify the 
conclusion that certain demands for accommodation clearly 
ought to be rejected.
Unfortunately, LaFollete and LaFollete’s explication of 
the claim that conscientious objectors must be able to offer 
a defense of the principle they seek to uphold is brief and 
somewhat muddled. For example, it is unclear whether a 
conscientious objector herself must be able to provide a 
minimally acceptable rational justification for the principle 
in question, or if it suffices that she is an active member of a 
community whose leaders can offer such a justification even 
though she cannot, or weaker still, that it merely be possible 
for someone to offer such a justification. More importantly, 
however, LaFollete and LaFollete misidentify the reason the 
conscientious objector offers the state in support of her claim 
that it ought to accommodate her. That reason is not the truth or 
reasonableness of the principles to which she wishes to remain 
true; rather, it is the importance of preserving her moral integrity, 
and so her sense of self-worth and of the meaning she finds in 
the way of life she leads. In seeking accommodation from the 
state, the conscientious objector does not rest her case on the 
assertion that compliance with a particular law or professional 
standard would be wrong.14 She likely believes that, of course, 
and if the state fails to accommodate her then that belief will 
likely figure in an explanation for her subsequent actions and 
attitudes (e.g., her disobedience to law, or the guilt she feels 
over having acted as the law requires). Still, the conscientious 
objector’s claim vis-à-vis the state is that she cannot in good 
conscience act as the law or professional code would have her 
act. This is so because she believes that the law or professional 
code conflicts with what morality truly requires, regardless of 
whether her belief is warranted. The professional’s claim that 
she cannot obey the law in good conscience highlights the 
state’s reason for accommodating her, namely, its defeasible 
duty to refrain from compelling agents to act contrary to their 
sincerely held moral beliefs. What requires a defense, then, 
is not the particular belief or commitment for which the 
conscientious objector seeks accommodation, but the claim 
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that people’s interest in maintaining their moral integrity is of 
sufficient moral importance to ground a conditional right of 
conscience. This position is one that LaFollete and LaFollete 
appear prepared to accept.
Indeed, there is some reason to think that it is a conscientious 
objector’s sincerity, and not the reasonableness of her beliefs or 
the quality of her inferences per se, that concern LaFollete and 
LaFollete. Having pointed out that conscientious refusal to fill 
prescriptions for emergency contraception rests on moral and 
non-moral beliefs that few people in the United States accept, 
they do not conclude that such refusals are unreasonable 
and so ought not to be accommodated. Rather, LaFollete and 
LaFollete write that “although this does not necessarily mean 
that the advocates of COP [a right of conscience to refuse to fill 
prescriptions for emergency contraception] do not hold moral 
views, it explains why their need to demonstrate that these are 
sincere moral beliefs is even higher than for the COW [a right 
of conscience to refuse to wage war] advocates.”15 This is a 
very different position than the one they endorse elsewhere. 
The reasonableness of a conscientious objector’s beliefs is no 
longer an independent condition for a right of conscience, but 
instead an evidentiary rule of thumb the state ought to employ 
in determining whether a conscientious objector satisfies a 
condition for such a right, namely, that he is sincere when he 
asserts a belief in the immorality of the law, and that violating 
it will require him to betray one of his deepest commitments. 
Whatever the merits of employing such an epistemic rule, it 
does not entail that there are certain sorts of beliefs that do not 
fall within the scope of a conditional right of conscience.
The discussion above also explains why neither implausible 
non-moral claims nor mistaken inferences vitiate a physician’s 
defeasible claim to accommodation. In their discussion of some 
pharmacists’ assertion of a right to conscientiously refuse to fill 
prescriptions for the morning-after pill, LaFollete and LaFollete 
challenge the claim that the use of this drug constitutes murder. 
Robert F. Card pursues this issue in even greater detail, and 
concludes that emergency contraception is problematic only 
if contraception itself is considered morally unacceptable.16 
Though I find these arguments compelling, I also think them 
beside the point when it comes to the question of whether 
pharmacists enjoy a conditional right to conscientiously refuse 
to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception. No matter how 
unreasonable a physician’s moral or non-moral beliefs, and no 
matter how egregiously mistaken her reasoning may be, if she 
believes that obedience to law will require her to act immorally 
then the law threatens her integrity. If, as I have argued, the state 
has a duty not to compel people to compromise their moral 
integrity, then regardless of the kind of belief to which a person 
seeks to remain true the state has a moral reason, albeit not a 
conclusive one, to accommodate her.
Card briefly considers the position defended here and 
offers three reasons to reject it. The first is a reductio ad 
absurdum argument: if the right of conscience is not limited to 
reasonable moral beliefs, he writes, then a person who objects 
to military service because he believes that wearing green in 
battle is morally evil has a right to accommodation.17 I find this 
rebuttal unconvincing for several reasons. It is hard to imagine a 
person sincerely holding this belief, and even harder to imagine 
circumstances in which we could have good evidence that the 
objector was sincere and not simply seeking to avoid military 
service for self-interested reasons. Moreover, some would argue 
that the belief in God (or in some specific conception of God), 
or the belief that God’s will can be known through specific texts, 
and so on, are just as absurd as the belief that wearing green 
in battle is morally evil. If the former are thought to provide an 
acceptable basis for a conditional right of conscience, a position 
Card does not challenge, then why not the latter?18 Besides, 
as should be clear by now, acknowledging a defeasible right 
of conscience on the part of a person who objects to wearing 
green in battle does not entail that, all things considered, this 
person should be accommodated. All that follows is that the 
state must not dismiss the objector’s claim out of hand, but 
instead offer a justification for its refusal to accommodate 
him (if, in fact, it does not do so) that identifies the competing 
moral considerations the state believes defeat or outweigh the 
objector’s right of conscience. Why think it absurd to require 
such a rationale?
The second reason Card offers for rejecting a right of 
conscience that encompasses fidelity to any moral belief, no 
matter how unreasonable, is that “on this understanding a 
provider can acceptably refuse EC [emergency contraception] 
based on (e.g.) sexist beliefs that women are inferior and should 
be pregnant as often as men want them to be.”19 Card claims 
that this is a “troubling implication,” though he does not explain 
why this is so. Admittedly, it would be a troubling implication if 
the right of conscience were absolute, but I do not claim that it 
is. Besides, it is not clear how a requirement that a conscientious 
objector be able to demonstrate the reasonableness of his 
belief addresses the challenge of weighing his claim to 
accommodation against others’ competing moral claims, 
including a woman’s (liberty-) right to become pregnant only 
if she chooses to do so. Neither the plausibility of an objector’s 
belief nor the quality of his moral reasoning make any difference 
to the cost he will bear if the state refuses to accommodate 
him, or the costs others will bear if it does exempt him from 
particular legal and professional requirements (costs which may 
determine the conditions under which a physician’s desire to be 
exempt from the law ought to be accommodated). Finally, we 
must be careful not to confuse the state’s accommodation of 
a conscientious objector with an endorsement of the principle 
he seeks to uphold. Indeed, legal recognition of a sexist 
physician’s right of conscience (under certain conditions) is 
perfectly consistent with criticism by the state of the principle 
the physician believes ought to guide his conduct.
Card’s third reason for rejecting an unrestricted right of 
conscience is that such a conception is at odds with the one 
currently employed by the military. Conscientious objectors to 
military service must defend themselves before a review board 
which awards an exemption from military service only for 
certain reasons (or, in many countries, only one reason, namely, 
opposition to killing (humans) in any circumstance). Were 
Card to raise the example of conscientious objection to military 
service solely for the purpose of challenging the claim that 
pharmacists enjoy an absolute right to conscientiously refuse 
to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, as LaFollete 
and LaFollete sometimes seem to do, then it would carry some 
argumentative weight. Given that the right to conscientiously 
refuse to perform military service is a conditional one, it would 
be surprising were the same not true of a right to conscientiously 
refuse to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception. 
But current practices vis-à-vis conscientious objection to 
military service do not support Card’s claim that the right of 
conscience is limited to reasonable moral beliefs and valid 
arguments. When a military review board investigates a putative 
conscientious objector’s claim to accommodation, it focuses 
almost exclusively on evidence for the sincerity of the objector’s 
opposition to killing in all circumstances. It makes no effort to 
assess the reasonableness of the world view that has led the 
objector to view all killing as immoral, nor to the quality of the 
objector’s reasoning (or that of the community to which he 
belongs and from which he has acquired his belief). Moreover, 
the fact that states currently place certain restrictions on the 
sorts of beliefs fidelity to which they will accommodate does 
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not justify those restrictions. That is not to say that the current 
policy regarding conscientious objectors to military service is 
unjustified. Rather, it is only to point out that, in the absence of 
a clearly articulated rationale for the current policy, we cannot 
infer from it that the state ought to acknowledge a defeasible 
claim to accommodation only for those objectors with beliefs 
it judges to be reasonable.
The arguments to this point, I believe, strongly support 
the position that there are no restrictions on the kind of 
commitments a person may assert a conditional right to uphold 
in the face of legal and professional obligations to do otherwise. 
Still, might the fact that a physician voluntarily enters the 
profession, and so freely and knowingly takes on the obligations 
attached to her professional role, entail that the state has no 
duty at all to accommodate her conscientious refusal to provide 
legally and professionally sanctioned services? LaFollete and 
LaFollete think so; they write that the case for even a conditional 
right of conscience is “far from overwhelmingly convincing, in 
large part, because they [medical professionals] entered the 
profession voluntarily, and because what they are being asked 
to do is a core part of their respective professions.”20 Brock, too, 
argues that in many cases a person’s freely choosing to take 
on a certain professional role, one she knew, or ought to have 
known, would require her to perform certain tasks, entails that 
she must either do so or exit that role (and, possibly, the entire 
profession).21 Were the argument from consent successful, 
it would render all of the previous discussion moot. The 
argument fails, or at least it is incomplete, and an explanation 
of its shortcomings reveals the importance of resolving the 
dispute over restrictions on the scope of a professional’s right 
of conscience that has been the focus of this essay.
The appeal to a professional’s voluntary entry into the 
profession to rebut her assertion of a right of conscience either 
evidences a failure to grasp the fundamental nature of the 
conscientious objector’s claim against the state, or begs the 
question against her. In declaring a right to conscientiously 
refuse to provide a particular service, a professional contends 
that neither the profession nor the state are morally (or, 
perhaps, legally) entitled to make provision of that service, in all 
circumstances, a condition for being licensed to practice. It is 
no response to this contention to simply assert that the objector 
voluntarily entered the profession. Rather, what the state (and 
the profession) must offer is a justification for making the right 
to practice conditional on a willingness to provide the service in 
question, with no accommodation for conscientious objectors 
other than in those cases that the state and the profession 
already recognize. Surely it will be able to do so in some cases. 
In others, however, it may not; that is, it may have no justification 
for refusing to accommodate those who conscientiously object 
to performing the service in question, at least under certain 
conditions. If, nevertheless, the state makes no attempt to 
accommodate these conscientious objectors, then it makes 
the freedom to practice dependent on conditions it lacks a 
moral right to impose. That claim—that neither the state nor 
the profession may make the liberty to practice conditional on 
consent to provide particular services in the circumstances in 
question—is the heart of an objector’s claim when she asserts 
a right of conscience. Where the protest is to the terms to which 
a person must agree in order to enjoy a particular privilege, the 
claim that the person did agree to the terms fails to grapple 
with the objection.
Disputes over the specific terms the state may justly impose 
on those who wish to practice medicine highlight the need 
for a compelling account of legitimate state authority, one 
that can provide the background against which the argument 
from consent may be more compelling. In particular, some 
justification must be offered for why the conscientiously 
objecting physician or pharmacist has a moral duty to defer to 
the state’s judgment that the present terms to which medical 
professionals must agree in order to enjoy a license to practice 
do not violate her right of conscience. Possibly that justification 
also rests on the physician’s consent, in this case to the state’s 
rule, though as I argue elsewhere there are good reasons to 
doubt that modern states’ moral authority rests on the consent 
of the governed.22 The point I wish to emphasize here, however, 
is only that the argument from consent does not suffice by itself 
to establish that physicians lack a conditional moral right to 
conscientiously refuse to provide specific legal and professional 
services.23
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